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ABSTRACT
The theoretical framework of complexity is beginning to attract 
wider attention in research on the armed forces, and consequently 
the views of those who face complexity on the ground should be 
explored in more detail. Failure to do so risks complexity remaining 
only a top-level theory lacking adequate connection to practice. 
This article seeks to address this issue through analyzing the views 
of Finnish military officers. Data for the research were gathered 
using a deliberation and data collection method called a security 
café. A total of 74 people, most of them holding the rank of captain 
in the army or air force or lieutenant senior grade in the navy, 
attended the security café. The data used in this research were 
elicited from 47 idea rating sheets, evaluated during the security 
café, and include both quantitative and qualitative data. The article 
analyzes those data to address the following questions in relation 
to the theoretical framework of the article: What kind of perceptions 
of the complexity of the security environment do officers hold? 
What kind of practices do officers consider fit the presumed com-
plexity of the security environment?
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“The international situation is the most complex and demanding that I have seen in all my 
years of service, and that’s over four decades.” 
–General (ret.) Jim Mattis (2017)
Several high-level military leaders have made reference to the growing complexity of 
the world. These include retired Generals Denis Mercier and Stanley McChrystal. 
Mercier (2018) considers that the world has transitioned from being merely complicated 
to being complex and McChrystal et al. (2015) note that the complicated challenges of the 
past were vastly different from today’s complex challenges. Both generals highlight an 
ability to rapidly adapt as a key requirement for anyone working in a complex operating 
environment, and the military is clearly not exempt from that requirement. A similar 
awareness of complexity is evident in official military documents, such as a 2015 U.S. 
Army publication, The Army Vision: Strategic Advantage in a Complex World and a 2012 
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Australian Army publication Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept. 
The former, for example, states that “over the next 10 years, it is likely the United States 
will face an unstable, unpredictable, increasingly complex global security environment” 
(U.S. Army 2015, 4). The latter includes the assessment, “while war has always been 
complex, the complexity of future wars will take a new form, necessitating greater 
adaptability from those actors that wish to be successful” (Australian Army, 2012, 23).
This matter has also been increasingly addressed in military science. Research has 
introduced readers to complexity science (e.g., Ryan 2009; Blouin 2013), deepened the 
understanding of complex adaptive systems (e.g., Dent and Holt 2001; Say and Pronk 
2012), presented complexity embracing leadership tasks (e.g., Paparone et al. 2008; 
Hanén 2017) and also offered a critique of the over-popularization of system and 
complexity thinking (e.g., Thomas 2019). However, there is a research gap concerning 
how members of the military in general perceive complexity as a scientific concept. Given 
that the theoretical framework of complexity is beginning to attract wider attention in the 
armed forces, the views of those who face complexity on the ground need to be explored 
in more detail. Failure to do so risks complexity remaining a top-level theory lacking 
adequate connection to practice. This article seeks to address this issue through analyzing 
the views of Finnish military officers.
Research data were collected through a security café. A security café is a deliberation 
and data collection method developed for security authorities and researchers to access 
the opinion of the general public on issues of importance to their safety and security (see 
Puustinen et al. 2020). In this case, the method was modified to gather the views of the 
Finnish Defence Forces officers on complexity. However, the structure of the security 
café remained essentially the same as in the standard version of the model. Over a period 
of four hours, 74 café participants first received information on the topic of the event (i.e., 
complexity science), then deliberated in small groups of six to eight people and, as the last 
step, evaluated the ideas and arguments that emerged during the small group discussions, 
using the idea rating sheet method (see Zhang et al. 2016). The data used in this research 
were elicited from 47 idea rating sheets and encompass both quantitative and qualitative 
data. The data elicited were analyzed to address the following questions in relation to the 
theoretical framework of the article:
(1) What kind of perceptions of the complexity of the security environment do [Finnish] 
military officers hold?
(2) What kind of practices do [Finnish] officers consider fit the presumed complexity of 
the security environment?
The article is structured as follows. The article begins with a review of literature related to 
complexity, the armed forces, and warfare. Thereafter, the data and methods are 
described in more detail. This section also includes a brief description of the Finnish 
context. Then, the study moves on to analyze the perspectives of Finnish military officers 
on complexity. Finally, a discussion section binds these results to the theoretical frame-
work of the article, and the conclusion section outlines potential research questions.
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Complexity, the armed forces, and warfare
Defining the complexity (of warfare)
The essence of complexity lies in two core properties: variety and interdependence (Ryan 
2009, see also Mitleton-Kelly 2003). Variety refers here to the many possible alternative 
states of the system and its parts, and interdependence to the intricate intertwining or 
interconnectivity between different actors and components within a system and between 
a system and its environment. As both Mercier (2018) and McChrystal et al. (2015) point 
out, complexity is a fundamentally different issue than complication (see also Cilliers 
2011). Ryan (2009) illustrates this point with the following example: A complicated 
problem is one involving an infantry mobility vehicle breaking down. Such a problem 
is reasonably straightforward for a subject matter expert to solve. First, the cause of the 
breakdown is diagnosed, perhaps necessitating some dismantling of the vehicle. Then the 
individual parts of the vehicle are repaired or replaced, after which the vehicle is 
reassembled into a functional unit. In the case of a complicated problem, it is also easy 
to evaluate whether or not the problem was solved. A complex problem could be 
represented by an infantry mobility vehicle breaking down in a hostile area. Due to 
time and context sensitivity, the problem cannot be solved by reductionist approaches. 
Instead a holistic approach that acknowledges the trade-offs and interrelationships would 
be required. Moreover, in the case of complex problems blueprints have a limited 
application as every problem is unique and the outcome of a problem-solving process 
is always uncertain (see Glouberman and Zimmerman 2002).
Complexity-oriented military scientists seem to agree on the complexity of warfare 
(e.g., Ryan 2009; Say and Pronk 2012; Rousseau 2003; Maher 2014). They also acknowl-
edge that complexity is not a new feature of warfare, but one previously recognized by 
military strategists and theorists such as Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz (Dent and Holt 
2001). An interesting development is that the complexity of warfare is generally viewed as 
increasing. This is mainly due to two core factors (Ryan 2009; Say and Pronk 2012; Maher 
2014). First, the operating environment is becoming more and more connected, espe-
cially because of increased globalization and the development of information and com-
munications technology. As a result, local phenomena can be very effective in influencing 
issues and phenomena, even globally. This relates to the concept of the strategic corporal 
which raises the possibility that actions of one individual at the tactical level can have 
dramatic and unforeseen impacts on operational and strategic scales (see e.g., Storr 
2003). Second, the increasing amount of information, its ambiguity, and the speed of 
information flows pose significant challenges to the ability to handle the uncertainty and 
instability of the operating environment. As Say and Pronk (2012, 120) summarize, 
“things are happening faster, and the activities of seemingly distant actors are now having 
a more rapid and often more significant impact.”
Looking at how warfare has changed over time can help understand this perceived 
increase in complexity. Zweibelson et al. (2017) define three different war movements. 
First, the classical military movement starting in ancient times and peaking in the late 
1600s–1800s. At that time, states prosecuted limited wars, following the mechanistic logic 
of linear decision-making. During this period, it was possible to start and conclude wars 
within the period of a single battle. The second period is referred to as the modern 
military movement, and it spans the 1800–1990 period. Warfare became attrition-based 
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total war. Complexity began to increase and approaches such as engineering, science, 
reductionism, and hierarchical command and control to dominate. Very few conflicts 
would be resolved by single battles. Next came the post-modernist military movement, 
which began in the 2000s; wars became highly asymmetric as the role of non-state actors 
and networks increased (see Marion and Uhl-Bien 2003; Bousquet 2012). In this complex 
and emergent post-modern security environment, many issues became blurred, includ-
ing, among others, the line between war and peace and the areas of operation of the 
armed forces. As Zweibelson et al. (2017, 91) state, “many of the non-military phenom-
enon seem to be linked in complex and non-linear ways with those that are decidedly in 
the purview of an Armed Forces.” In a similar temporal fashion, Bousquet (2008) defines 
four regimes within the scientific way of warfare. These regimes and their paradigmatic 
technologies are mechanistic warfare and the clock; thermodynamic warfare and the 
engine; cybernetic warfare and the computer; and chaoplexic (a combination of chaos 
and complexity) warfare and the network.
Nevertheless, the assertion that complexity is increasing is not universally accepted. 
Tourish (2018) wonders whether the challenges humanity faced in the past – such as the 
Great Depression in the 1930s and rebuilding Europe after World War II – were truly less 
complex than the challenges faced today. Tourish surmises that every new generation 
might imagine the problems it faces are more challenging, faster-paced, and complex 
than those faced by previous generations. On the other hand, it is also worth noting that 
the view of increasing complexity may be colored by the expanding awareness of the 
complex nature of warfare (see Ryan 2009). The discussion about increasing complexity 
is also challenged by the fact that there is no agreed definition of complexity; thus, there is 
not even complete certainty over what any measure of the perceived growth of complex-
ity should encompass (Lineweaver et al. 2010).
Another interesting discussion is the extent to which complexity can be taken out of the 
equation. Can, for example, the uncertainty caused by complexity be reduced or eliminated 
entirely with the advancement of information and communications technology? More 
specifically, the question is if the sources of uncertainty are not fundamental but stem 
from limits to the available technology (see Ryan 2009). Rousseau (2003) discusses the issue 
from the perspective of battlespace visibility. He states that non-linear dynamics make war 
uncertain in a fundamental way: “Uncertainty is not merely an initial environmental 
condition that can be reduced by gathering information and displaying it on a computer 
screen. It is not that we currently lack the technology to gather enough information but will 
someday have the capability.” (Rousseau 2003, 37) Similarly, Richardson et al. (2000, 39) 
consider that the incompressibility of complex systems problematizes military operational 
analysis, that is, due to sensitivity to initial conditions and the blurring of boundaries, “it is 
impossible to have an account of a complex system that is less complex than the system 
itself.” Additionally, Ryan (2009) shares a Clausewitzian view that more information can, in 
reality, often increase uncertainty and be false or contradictory. Storr (2003), among others, 
states that information and communications technology can make war and armed conflict 
even more complex and dynamic, as it increases and intensifies the connectivity between 
people. Finally, Zweibelson (2016a, pp. 29–30) introduces the concept of Jominian 
Hindsight, which depicts the fundamental complexity of warfare and the harmful habit of 
abstracting it out:
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According to [Antoine-Henri] Jomini, a military leader would win any military conflict with 
the proper combination of his principles, be it mass and surprise and speed, or perhaps x, y, 
and z. If any commander applied them and failed, the ‘Jominian Hindsight’ responds with, 
“You did not apply my principles correctly.” These endless cycles of methodological 
tinkering remain superficial, in that they fail to address the deeper issues that plague 
accurate sensemaking and anticipation of complex military scenarios. We are most apt to 
critique (or fire) the military leader, fiddle with the methodology, and reboot with the same 
processes in play wearing slightly different clothing.
Operating in a complex security environment
Kopsch and Fox (2016) highlight the role of problem framing. It is important to not only 
identify the right problem, but also to be aware of the type of the identified problem and 
its possible connections to other problems. Misidentifying the problem at hand – for 
example seeing a complex problem as a merely complicated one – can easily lead to the 
wrong approach to the right problem and severely hinder the implementation of an 
effective operational approach. The military leader should then be careful not to tame 
complex problems (see Churchman 1967), but also not to step into a complexity trap, to 
overcomplicate everything (see Raisio and Lundström 2015). Therefore, a complexity- 
aware leader ought to be able to separate routine management issues from the more 
complex variants.
In addition, one of the central principles of operating in a complex environment is that 
the complexity of the system and the system environment should in a sense be in balance. 
The basis for this notion has been ascribed to Ross Ashby’s law of requisite variety, the 
central message of which can be summarized as “only variety can destroy variety” (Ashby 
2011, 206). The development of complexity sciences has allowed Ashby’s law to be modified 
into a law of requisite complexity, according to which the complexity of the system should 
correspond to the complexity of the system’s environment (Boisot and McKelvey 2011). 
A related notion is that of Bar-Yam (2004, 2015) who distinguishes between conventional 
and complex conflicts and warfare. Conventional conflicts – such as the Gulf War – 
necessitate tightly coordinated and hierarchically controlled large-scale military behavior. 
In complex conflicts – such as the war in Afghanistan – high variety behavior becomes 
important. Such fine-scale behavior is semi-autonomous and weakly coordinated, able to 
take advantage of the “space of possibilities” (Bar-Yam 2004, 2015; see also Blouin 2013). 
Structures of military organizations should then ideally match the tasks to be accomplished, 
that is, to have matching complexity profiles. As stated by Bar-Yam (2004, 43), in relation to 
Al-Qaeda, “the asymmetric war against terrorists is generally understood to be highly 
complex, and the large number of possible actions that might have to be taken is a clear 
indicator of the variety necessary of the system that might effectively oppose them” (see also 
McChrystal et al. 2015; Norman and Bar-Yam 2018).
Mercier (2018) aptly describes, in the context of NATO’s adaptation in an age of 
complexity, this tense relationship between large-scale and fine-scale behavior. In this 
context, large-scale behavior could be understood to refer to NATO’s ability to manage 
the requirements of a large-scale, all-out conflict. Fine-scale behavior is then more about 
NATO’s flexibility to be able to adapt to the evolutions of the operational environment. 
March (1991) originally described this as a tension between exploitation and exploration. 
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Exploitation is characterized as refining, selecting, implementing, and executing opera-
tions, whereas exploration is an activity based on searching, risk taking, experimenting, 
discovering, and innovating. While exploitation rests on established routines, exploration 
emphasizes the identification of new opportunities and alternatives. Ideally, any military 
organization would need to be able to operate simultaneously, or ambidextrously, and 
thus balance on the “edge of chaos” (Mercier 2018, see also Uhl-Bien and Arena 2018).
In addition to the need for detailed problem framing and the importance of having 
matching complexity profiles, more specific modes of action to operate in a complex 
security environment have also been mentioned in the literature. One such operating 
model is the mission command. The term relates to “decentralisation and local flexibility 
within the overall intent [of the superior commander]” (Storr 2003, p. 126, see also 
Rousseau 2003). The premise is that when subordinates are not restricted by overly strict 
orders, they can be creative, make independent decisions, and adapt to changing circum-
stances. The superior commander’s intent then serves as a guiding principle, but with the 
minimum of control measures. The same applies to military organizations in general. If 
military organizations are understood as complex adaptive systems, their self-organizing 
potential should not be unduly restricted, as to do so would hinder their capacity to adapt 
to a changing environment. Instead, organizational values and visions – in a similar 
fashion to a commander’s intent – would “provide the organization with a strong anchor 
that will enable self-renewal without experiencing chaos” (Dent and Holt 2001, 104).
The literature also highlights whole-of-government approaches, such as the Swedish 
Total Defence concept (see e.g., Zweibelson et al. 2017) and the Finnish Comprehensive 
Security concept (see e.g., Puustinen et al. 2020). These approaches are based on the idea 
that complexity ought to be addressed by a range of actors, instead of by any single 
authority. Complex problems, in a sense, exist between the spaces of different actors, 
resulting in the problem no longer belonging to any one actor alone. Roles blur as armed 
forces are becoming more involved in what are termed military operations other than war 
and as civil agencies are working more closely with the military organizations. Ideally, 
deeper cooperation within the armed forces as well as between the armed forces and 
other actors would lead to more holistic approaches rather than actors being limited to 
strictly defined areas of responsibility (Dent and Holt 2001; Zweibelson et al. 2017).
Context, data, and methods
The Finnish context
The Finnish approach to security has evolved over time to reflect changes to the interna-
tional security environment and new approaches to it. The idea of expanding security as 
a concept, both vertically and horizontally, is a global phenomenon, especially in the 
Western security mindset. However, there are some features in the Finnish context that 
influence the development of the Finnish security approach and its current character.
Finland has a long history of being located between East and West, having for 
hundreds of years been part of the Kingdom of Sweden, and later an autonomous region 
of Tsarist Russia, and for the last hundred years an independent state. The society has 
been carefully moving toward alignment with Western Europe but still balancing 
a position in the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, and later integrating into 
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European institutions and anchoring in the West – and the whole time far in the North, 
at the edge of Europe. The survival of a small state has required adaptable solutions at 
quite different times.
Finland’s geopolitical situation has been reflected in the processes of Finlandization, 
a product of Finland’s Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with 
the Soviet Union. Finlandization can be defined here for example as “a voluntary foreign 
policy strategy or, in a lesser sense, a foreign policy instrument that aims to reassure 
a more powerful state, usually a neighbour, either through bilateral politics or other 
means such as reinforcing regional stability through a neutralist foreign policy posture.” 
(Juntunen 2017, 65). In general, Finland’s security policy has always involved a process of 
balancing; avoiding provocation and strengthening international norms and institutions, 
with Russia’s strength or weakness in any particular period influencing the direction and 
strength of the movement. During the Cold War, Finland declared itself a neutral 
country, and accepted responsibility for its own defense.
Since the end of the Cold War, the wording Finland uses to describe its status has 
changed to militarily non-aligned and defense cooperation has increased internationally, 
including through participation in a range of peacekeeping operations both traditional and 
otherwise. Finland has historically emphasized the importance of foreign policy as a means 
of influencing its security environment. In this sense, the traditional Finnish approach is 
aligned with increased international cooperation (especially with Sweden, see e.g., 
Lundqvist and Widen 2016; Møller 2019; Wither 2020) and an attempt to influence security 
Figure 1. An example of an idea rating sheet from a previous security café (originally Diceman 2014).
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beyond the state’s own borders or the near abroad. On the other hand, Finland is still 
preparing for highly unlikely but serious consequences of traditional national defense 
scenarios that must be confronted with a national set of tools.
Another feature that has a direct impact on security thinking is the fact that Finland’s 
military defense is still based on conscription and a large body of reservists (see Kosonen 
et al. 2019). Military conscription has a relatively high level of acceptance and even today 
around 65% of men in the required age group complete military service. The mainte-
nance of conscription means the defense forces address the issue of their acceptability in 
society in a direct interaction with a large part of the population. The conscripts and their 
relatives get an idea of the use of armed forces and military threats, and the defense forces 
also confronted with their trainees’ views on various security situations.
As the perspective on security broadens, the notion of comprehensive security offers at 
least a partial solution to potential security issues. Comprehensive security is a widely 
accepted starting point for a model in which important functions of society are protected 
and sustained cross-functionally in all circumstances and in the face of various crises or 
disruptions (see The Finnish Government 2017; Griffith 2018; Wither 2020). The Finnish 
Concept for Comprehensive Security is worthy of mention owing to its two specific 
features: In Finland, exceptionally well-established and far-reaching cooperation between 
different actors is sought and a very large number of actors have been successfully 
integrated. In addition to the authorities, representatives of industry, academia, and non- 
governmental organizations, as well as individual citizens, are actively involved in the 
Finnish model. In Finland, the notion of security is commonly understood to refer to 
both individual safety and collective security. The vertical widening of the security 
concept down from governmental or even inter-governmental level down through 
organizations and individuals therefore feels natural even if the broadening of perspec-
tives seems to add to the complexity of the matter.
A security café as a data collection method
The security café is an adjusted deliberative democratic method deriving from the ideals 
of deliberative democracy and deliberative mini-publics (Puustinen et al. 2020). 
Deliberative democracy is a form of democracy that values discussion, reflection, and 
consideration over simply voting or responding to a questionnaire (e.g., Yankelovich 
1991; Chambers 2003), and is often seen as an umbrella term for a wide variety of 
innovative deliberative democratic processes (e.g., Nabatchi 2010). These are commonly 
called deliberative mini-publics (Grönlund et al. 2014). The security café is a combination 
of the traditional citizens’ jury and world café methods, and as such, can be positioned 
between the intermediate and expansive definition categories of deliberative mini-publics 
(see Ryan and Smith 2014).
A security café typically lasts for three to five hours and involves receiving informa-
tion, facilitated small group deliberations, and the use of idea rating sheets. In previous 
projects, the security-café method has been used to involve ordinary citizens in delibera-
tions on issues related to the domains of safety and security (e.g., asylum seeker policy 
and hybrid threats), and also to harvest the viewpoints of local and regional public 
authorities and NGO representatives on the co-creation of safety and security in 
Finland (see Puustinen et al. 2020).
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In this case, the security-café method was modified specifically to gather the views of 
Finnish military officers on complexity. The aim was to keep the structure as similar as 
possible to the original model. Ideally, security cafés aim to enroll a large number of 
people and to choose a diverse group of around 25–30 participants. This time, however, 
the participants were pre-selected. Participants were students on a general staff officer 
course, and the security café was inserted into their course. A total of 74 people attended 
the security café and all but one were military officers.1 Of the 73 officers, most were 
captains in the army or air force or lieutenants (senior grade) in the navy, although there 
were also a few participants holding the rank of major and lieutenant commander. Seven 
officers of the national border guard were also part of this group.
The four-hour event, implemented in August 2019, began with an introduction of the 
security-café method, which was followed by an hour-long lecture on complexity think-
ing conducted by the two authors of the article. The lecture covered the differences 
between the mechanistic Newtonian paradigm and the complex-systems paradigm, and 
we placed particular emphasis on the concepts of non-linearity, self-organization, emer-
gence, and the edge of chaos. The participants were offered the opportunity to ask specific 
questions at the end of the lecture. Next, the participants were divided randomly into 
groups of six or seven people. Unlike traditional security cafés, the groups did not have 
external facilitators, but for practical reasons, the participants selected the facilitators 
themselves. The café consisted of three rounds of deliberations: 1) complexity and the 
global security environment, 2) complexity and the Finnish security environment and 3) 
how complexity should be taken into account, for example, in the preparation and 
implementation of national security and defense policy. In practice the themes and 
rounds overlapped during the deliberations.
An important part of a security café is the use of idea rating sheets (see Zhang et al. 2016). 
During the small group deliberations, each group was provided with five blank idea rating 
sheets. Each time an idea/statement emerged that the group wanted the whole café to evaluate, 
they wrote it on the sheet (see the top left corner of the sheet in Figure 1). Idea rating sheets are 
a method for recognizing points of agreement among a large number of people. Participants 
simply record their level of agreement with any given idea on the sheets. This results in 
a graph-like visual representation of the group’s collective opinion. (Diceman 2014, p. 4.)
During the last step of the security café, idea rating sheets were collected and spread on 
tables to allow the participants to evaluate them. First, participants rated their views on 
the ideas on a 6-point Likert scale anchored with strongly agree and strongly disagree, and 
with a do not know option offered too. Commenting on the idea rating sheets follows the 
basic logic of a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) analysis, in 
that each participant could comment on each sheet, write about the opportunities and 
strengths plus the weaknesses and threats related to the presented idea (see the bottom 
left corner of the sheet in Figure 1). Due to the large number of café participants and the 
limited size of the sheet (A3), participants could also post their comments on sticky 
notelets and such contributes were considered part of the content of the ranking sheet. 
A total of 42 idea rating sheets were generated and evaluated during the café event, and 
the participants were also asked to contribute to five idea rating sheets prepared in 
advance by the researchers. The purpose of those five sheets was to enable specific 
comparisons to be made if similar security cafés were arranged in the future. The café 
participants were not able to see these pre-prepared idea rating sheets until the end of the 
DEFENCE STUDIES 9
café event when they evaluated the entire collection of 47 sheets. The contents of the pre- 
prepared sheets thus had no effect on the small group discussions.
All 47 idea rating sheets were transcribed. Participants were not required to contribute to all 
the sheets, so the number of respondents ranged from 33 to 61, with an average of 47 
responses per sheet. The number of sheets may have caused some rating fatigue among the 
participants, and we cannot be certain that some sheets were not just overlooked by some 
respondents. The responses on a Likert scale constitute the quantitative data of this article. The 
sheets contained between eight and 29 comments, with an average of 17 comments per sheet. 
These comments, and the ideas/statements themselves, constitute the qualitative data of the 
article.
The analysis began with a detailed review of the transcribed idea rating sheets so as to 
derive an overall view of the data. Next, in order to facilitate the processing of the sheets, 
ideas were deductively combined into concrete themes, broadly divided under the two 
research questions: For example, ideas/statements related to the cooperation between 
public authorities, the role of citizens, and the Finnish Concept for Comprehensive 
Security formed a main category (theme) labeled whole-of-government approaches. After 
the themes had been formulated, the comments on the sheets associated with each theme 
were categorized meaning the comments were not analyzed by sheet but by theme. This 
approach permitted a broader understanding, especially since the ideas/statements within 
each theme were broadly similar.
Owing to the large number of idea rating sheets, the following results section will not 
explicitly review them all, and the focus is more on themes rather than individual sheets. 
In addition, due to the length of ideas/statements presented on the idea rating sheets, it is 
not possible to present them in their entirety, for example as a tabulated part of the text. 
However, the ideas/statements explicitly mentioned in the text are reproduced in full, 
with frequency distributions, in the endnotes. For direct quotes, the texts of the idea 
rating sheets were translated from Finnish to English. For the sake of clarity, we will 
mainly use the term statement in the next results section when describing an idea or 
statement written on an idea rating sheet during small group discussions (i.e., the top left 
corner of the sheet in Figure 1). Similarly, we mainly use the term comment when 
describing participants’ individual assessment of ideas or statements made in the idea 
rating sheets (i.e., the bottom left corner of the sheet in Figure 1).
When analyzing and interpreting the results of this security café, it is important to bear 
in mind the possible effects of the context (the general staff officer course at the National 
Defence University) and the potential normative authority the military context may impose 
on the deliberation. The small groups only consisted of officers of similar rank (as described 
earlier), but most importantly, they worked as classmates, not as part of a hierarchical chain 
of command. None of the participants’ senior officers were present in the groups, nor were 
their teachers or the researchers, thus ensuring as neutral and open a discussion space as 
possible. Due to the potential for normative authority to appear in military contexts we 
might assume a reasonably homogenous distribution of both ideas presented in the 
deliberations and opinions expressed when rating those ideas; however, ideas and opinions 
were widely dispersed, as will be demonstrated in the results. The situation permits us to 
cautiously infer that the ideas and opinions expressed are the genuine opinions of the 
individuals, and not only statements echoing the normative military canon.
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Results
The results are presented following the logic of the two research questions. First, we 
report the perceptions of the officers on the complexity of the security environment (the 
first research question), after which the practices that the officers associated with working 
in complex contexts are analyzed (the second research question).
Perceived complexity
One of the idea rating sheets prepared in advance by the researchers presented a statement 
that the current security environment is complex. The majority of the respondents (92%) 
declared themselves partly or fully in agreement with this statement.2 However, the 
comments in the sheet emphasized that this is not a new feature, as exemplified by the 
comment: “The security environment has always been complex!” Complexity was consid-
ered to be ever present wherever human beings are, though the perceived difference is that 
“ . . . now we are just more aware of its inevitable existence.”
The café participants expressed more diverse views on the recent growth of complex-
ity. One idea rating sheet included a statement that the level of complexity does not really 
change, that is, complexity only appears to be growing over the course of time, particu-
larly owing to increased volumes of data and accelerated data transfer.3 As one partici-
pant commented, “transmission systems do not add complexity, but do make it visible.” 
Several other idea rating sheets did however challenge that view. Four sheets, albeit using 
different wording in their statements, explicitly highlighted how digitalization increases 
the complexity of the global security environment; a statement agreed upon by a clear 
majority of respondents contributing to each sheet. Social media was seen as a “fierce 
catalyst”.4 Other factors mentioned included information overload, real-time decision- 
making and the lack of delay, and limited human data processing capability.5
The aforementioned idea ratings sheets, clustered around the theme of digitalization, 
provided detailed commentary on how digitalization might be hoped to aid operating in 
a complex security environment. As an opportunity provided by digitalization, the devel-
opment of analytical tools – especially artificial intelligence – was highlighted as a way to 
facilitate better and faster interpretation of data and information, and to develop foresight: 
“Humans have limited cognition. Artificial intelligence will make up for it.” “There is more 
information, but it is getting easier and easier to manage.” “The fact that something cannot 
be controlled now does not mean that it cannot be controlled [in the future].” Digitalization 
can then be perceived as a double-edged sword. While more sophisticated analytical 
techniques seem to be expected to reduce complexity, many other issues related to 
digitalization can in turn increase it. Examples offered of such issues included network 
security vulnerabilities, and the increase in the number of actors in the operating environ-
ment. This latter issue was explicitly commented on: “Social media and digitalization will 
increase the number of potential influencers as information sharing is easy.”
The impact of globalization on complexity – as in the increasing global level inter-
twining and interconnectivity – was also addressed on several idea rating sheets. One 
sheet contained a statement that Finland would no longer be “a land of milk and honey” 
and that many global threats currently affect Finland’s security environment.6 A large 
majority of the respondents (88%) agreed with this statement. The statements on two 
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idea ratings sheets even claimed that Finland’s security environment today is – in its 
fractal nature – the same as the global security environment. However, the respondents’ 
views were divided on those two sheets; a slight majority (59% and 64%) believed that the 
Finnish security environment still has its own special features that seem to create 
a sensitivity to initial conditions7.8 These features were, among others, “location on the 
map” and maintaining a large military reserve force. As one café participant commented, 
“[national] states also face internal and regional threats and challenges, all of which may 
not be reflected far and wide.”
In a reference to globalization, one idea rating sheet claimed the diversification of threats 
increased disruptions in the global security environment.9 This was a view supported by 
a slight majority of the respondents (57%); an example of a comment indicating such 
support being: “complexity is created by non-state actors and their interests.” However, just 
as the “novelty” of the complexity of the security environment was questioned above, so too 
was the notion of the diversification of threat. A comment asked for example, if people 
thought that terrorism had not existed before the current time. Other contributions suggest 
that today we might just be more aware of possible threats than in the past and this 
awareness itself triggers the perception of increasing and diversifying risks, while the actual 
situation may not have changed significantly from that of the past.
In the context of the somewhat divided debate above, it is important to consider whether 
the emphasis on increasing complexity only makes issues more complex than they actually 
are. This issue was addressed in the content of one of the idea rating sheets prepared in 
advance by the researchers. The sheet included a statement that we often step into 
a complexity trap, that is, we tend to make the problems we face more complex than they 
are.10 A majority of respondents (68%) agreed with this statement. One café participant 
warned that perceiving issues as too complex carries the danger that we fall into “paralyzing 
relativism.” However, another comment noted that we often succumb to simplifying issues 
and drawing conclusions too quickly, or as one of the café participants stated, “to understand 
issues, the human/soldier tends to simplify, not to complicate (as there is no time).” 
Moreover, comments added to another pre-prepared sheet strongly questioned whether 
only complex solutions can solve the problems of a complex operating environment.11
Practices for operating in a complex security environment
Concepts and policies
One pre-prepared idea rating sheet addressed the general question of whether the concepts 
of complexity help to improve understanding of the security environment.12 The majority 
of the respondents (71%) agreed with that they did. These concepts were seen as broad-
ening thinking, supporting complexity leadership, and “[helping] to understand that not 
everything can be understood.” Here, however, the difficulty in understanding the concepts 
was perceived as a complicating factor. In addition, one participant commented that “the 
concepts of complexity are, in part, just a terminology gimmick.” At its worst, concepts of 
complexity were seen to adversely affect the clarity needed for decision-making.
At the macro level, café participants working in small groups discussed the importance 
of safety and security related policies and their suitability to a complex operating 
environment. The views of the respondents were almost evenly divided as to whether 
Finland’s policies would be appropriate to address the country’s complex security 
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environment.13 This particular theme was also accompanied by a statement made on 
another idea rating sheet that Finnish security policy aims to respond to a complex 
security environment by maintaining options (e.g., the NATO option).14 The majority of 
respondents (71%) partially agreed with the statement. This stance of maintaining 
options attracted the most comments in relation to safety and security related policies 
and complexity. Maintaining options was seen as a way to preserve the ability to respond 
to multiple situations and to increase adaptability: “Not everything can be predicted, but 
adaptivity helps to react.” Then again, this stance was also strongly criticized. Some 
participants stated that too many options stifle action and could lead to aims and 
objectives becoming hazy, and thus to indecision. Café participants pointed out that 
“despite the complexity, decisions have to be made” and that “‘indecision’ is the better 
word to describe the maintenance of options.”
The whole-of-government approaches and resilience
In the spirit of holistic whole-of-government approaches, one of the idea rating sheets 
contained a statement that rather than producing separate security and defense policy 
related reports to guide Finland’s policies, the Finnish Government should produce only 
a Comprehensive Security report.15 However, the majority of respondents (66%) were 
critical of this idea, and the reasoning offered included that such a holistic report could 
easily become too general and extensive, which in turn would make planning its execution 
more difficult and not give sufficient direction for the development of defense policy. At the 
operational level, however, the café participants’ attitude toward the Comprehensive 
Security policy was significantly more positive. A total of nine idea rating sheets, one of 
which had been formulated beforehand by the researchers, dealt directly with this theme.
A large majority of respondents (90%) considered the Finnish Concept for 
Comprehensive Security to be Finland’s response to the challenges of the complex security 
environment.16 All of the respondents strongly or partially agreed that the cooperation 
between public authorities would increase the resilience of society and its ability to 
respond to a complex operating environment.17 The content of one idea rating sheet 
did, however, emphasize that the Comprehensive Security model must be adaptive to 
respond to the complexity of the security environment.18 The reality of this statement 
could be evaluated through the pre-prepared idea rating sheet,19 which included a claim 
that the Finnish concept of Comprehensive Security is adaptive, that is, adaptable to the 
challenges of a complex operating environment. Respondents were relatively positive 
about this, with only 22% holding a critical or neutral view.
In their comments, participants particularly highlighted the diversity of capacities as 
a positive aspect of the Finnish Comprehensive Security model. It was considered that 
“Comprehensive Security harnesses many different capabilities [in society]” and thus 
“increases the range of means to respond to a broad threat base.” Furthermore, the agility 
of the model was mentioned. When prompted to consider developments, respondents 
advocated that the boundaries between organizations should be lowered further than 
currently. This was seen as particularly related to the development of legislation. The 
participants also pointed out that it is too restrictive to consider the issues of comprehensive 
security and societal resilience solely from the point of view of the public authorities: “In 
addition to cooperation between authorities, it is important to strengthen the resilience of 
citizens” and put another way, “Resilience comes from the people, not the authorities.”
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The preceding issues of resilience and citizen involvement were addressed on three idea 
rating sheets. Café participants were rather divided on whether resilience should be 
strengthened by committing each citizen to the tasks of comprehensive security as a way 
of responding to a more complex operating environment.20 They, for example, expressed 
doubts about the citizens’ commitment to genuine action. The participants were slightly 
more united in feeling that safety and security issues should be communicated better 
throughout society than they are currently, which they thought might be achieved through 
introducing security issues into education and reinforced during upbringing21 .22 As one 
participant commented, “The Comprehensive Security model and the resilience of society 
should be incorporated into the education of every citizen.” However, there was some 
concern expressed in the appended comments over citizens’ capability to understand 
complex issues: “Understanding extreme complexity requires years of familiarity. Also, in 
the future, the majority of the population will not reach this [level of] understanding.”
Reducing hierarchy and enabling self-organization
A distinct group of four idea rating sheets included statements on the need to reduce 
hierarchy levels and enable self-organization. The majority of the respondents (75%) con-
sidered that bureaucratic and hierarchical command structures make it difficult to adapt in 
a complex operating environment.23 Accordingly, complexity should be taken into account in 
the implementation of the Comprehensive Security model by delegating power to authorities 
at the lower levels of the hierarchy, increasing the freedom of action of executive authorities 
and establishing a cooperative relationship at ever lower levels of authority.24 A strong 
majority of the respondents (85%) supported that approach either fully or partially. 
Another sheet included the statement that moving the decision-making power as low 
down the hierarchy as possible would require everyone to act in accordance with the mission 
command to achieve the common objective (i.e., Comprehensive Security) .25 Another sheet 
contained the proposal that having a mission command is a way to handle complexity, 
a statement with which a majority of the respondents (81%) agreed.26
In the comments, the benefits of relatively flat hierarchies and self-organization were 
particularly associated with increased agility and adaptability. As café participants com-
mented, “organizational hierarchy does not encourage adaptability” and “a lack of free-
dom of action kills adaptability” However, the participants did not see this as an either-or 
issue but saw merit in a relatively tall hierarchy too. The respondents were aware that in 
the security context the actors at the lower levels may not always see the whole picture, 
and hence, “overly autonomous lower-level leaders may, from their own perspective, 
make excellent decisions, but, those decisions may not be the most efficient and effective 
for the whole.” A mission command was seen – as long as the objectives are clearly 
defined and understood throughout the organization – as facilitating agile action in 
unexpected situations by enabling leaders to perform the task in the way they see fit. The 
counter opinion expressed was that an over emphasis on a mission command structure 
could also be seen as commanding officers escaping responsibility.
Resources involved in responding to complexity
The last broader theme, represented through four idea rating sheets, dealt with the issue 
of the resources Finland could draw upon to respond to complexity. Although each sheet 
used slightly different terminology to reflect a range of views, those views were fairly 
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evenly divided.27 The central debate in the comments concerned whether a small country 
could survive in the complex world alone or whether it should form alliances with others. 
Some commented that no one could survive without alliances in a complex world, that is, 
alliances were seen to unlock enhanced resources to deal with complex problems. 
However, others viewed complexity as an advantage for a small country, in that, 
a small country can be more adaptive and thus more capable of responding to changes 
in an operating environment.
Discussion
With regard to the first research question of the study, the perceptions of the Finnish 
military officers who attended the security café were quite similar to the perspectives 
presented in the theory section of this article. The majority of the café participants 
considered the concepts of complexity useful, indicating that complexity thinking does 
not seem to be only top-level theorizing conducted by generals or academics lacking 
adequate connections to real-world contexts. First, the café participants and researchers 
(e.g., Ryan 2009; Say and Pronk 2012) concur that the security environment is a complex 
one, albeit the abovementioned research addresses the narrower field of the complexity of 
warfare. Both cohorts also saw complexity as a long-standing phenomenon that we are 
only now beginning to understand. However, Finnish officers seemed to be slightly more 
critical about the increase of complexity than academics have been (cf. also McChrystal 
et al. 2015; Mercier 2018). Despite digitalization and globalization being mentioned as 
influencing factors, the security-café participants did not unreservedly accept that com-
plexity in absolute terms was increasing. Interestingly, in their comments, some of the 
café participants proposed that the uncertainty caused by complexity could be reduced or 
controlled with the advances in analytical tools and especially artificial intelligence. This 
is – due to the incompressibility of complex systems – in stark contrast to the points 
made in theory (e.g., Rousseau 2003).
The Finnish military officers also pointed out that the discussion about increasing 
complexity may in fact contribute to making things seem more complex than they 
actually are. This relates to the role of problem framing, highlighted for example by 
Kopsch and Fox (2016). As theory and practice show, military personnel should be 
careful not to step into a complexity trap, however, neither should they succumb to 
simplifying issues and drawing conclusions too quickly. The results also showed a clear 
contrast with the law on requisite complexity. While the theory indicates that the 
complexity of the system should correspond to the complexity of the system’s environ-
ment, that is, the relevant complexity profiles should match (see e.g., Bar-Yam 2004; 
Ashby 2011; Boisot and McKelvey 2011) café participants were highly skeptical that only 
complex solutions could solve the problems of a complex operating environment. 
However, as one of the café participants commented, the explanation for this skepticism 
may be that the word only used in the statement and presented on an idea rating sheet 
was considered to present too stark a description.
With regard to the second research question of the study, the issue of balancing at the 
edge of chaos (see e.g., Mercier 2018; Uhl-Bien and Arena 2018) emerged from the 
empirical data in two instances especially. First in relation to how café participants 
evaluated the suitability of Finnish policies in a complex security environment. There 
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was debate over whether the maintenance of options was to help preserve the ability to 
respond to multiple situations and to increase adaptability, or whether too many options 
stifle action and introduce a certain haziness and indecision into the aims and objectives. 
The second was related to the need to reduce hierarchy levels and enable self- 
organization. Although participants strongly supported this as an approach suitable for 
a complex operating environment, they did not consider this an either-or issue, but saw 
value in both hierarchies and self-organization. This view is in line with March’s (1991) 
perspective on positive tensions between exploitation and exploration and Mercier’s 
(2018) on the struggle involved in operating and adapting simultaneously.
Both academic literature (see e.g., Zweibelson et al. 2017) and the gathered empirical 
data highlight that a complex security environment necessitates whole-of-government 
approaches. Finnish officers particularly emphasized the Finnish Concept for 
Comprehensive Security, which was seen as Finland’s attempt to meet the challenges 
presented by complexity. Complexity is then confronted by the actions of multiple actors; 
a group that the café participants underlined extends beyond civil agencies working 
closely with armed forces, but also encompasses citizens with strengthened resilience.
Conclusions
The key points arising from the study are that the issue of the complexity of the security 
environment is neither just appearing as we speak nor is it dissipating – it has been 
present since humans first formed communities and is likely to grow due to increasing 
connectivity and interdependence, although there are contrasting views. Responding to 
the complexity of the operating environment seems to rely on a capability for adaptation. 
Importantly, complexity is essentially not about an either/or but a both/and mindset. 
Dichotomies (such as hierarchies vs. self-organization) do not work well in the era of 
complexity, hence actors must have multiple operational capabilities available simulta-
neously, that is, their strategies must be ambidextrous (see March 1991). It is also vital 
not to fall into a complexity trap but equally important not to oversimplify issues or draw 
hasty conclusions. Therefore, working and leading in a complex operating environment 
has been referred to as both tuning (Hanén 2017) and maneuvering (Puustinen 2017).
The topic of complexity is unlikely to decline in popularity in the 2020s. Initiatives 
such as the Global Risks Reports (World Economic Forum 2019, 2020) and the UN Global 
Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR 2019) highlight that an increasing 
amount of systemic risk and geopolitical turbulence will become the new normal. 
Consequently, complexity research seems likely to thrive in the future. It is however 
important that complexity research retains its critical acuity and does not become an 
excessive trend. Otherwise there is a risk of research related to complex-systems para-
digms suffering the same fate as the heavily popularized chaos theory and not always 
being regarded as a credible scientific approach (see Hanén 2017). The data analyzed for 
this article do contain some suggestion that credibility is under threat, in that a café 
participant warned of the concepts of complexity research being mere terminological 
gimmicks. We should also bear in mind that even though it is very natural for members 
of the military to operate in a complex operating environment this does not mean that 
there is not room for improvement. As stated by Maher (2014, 67), “[western militaries] 
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intuitively grasp the utility of complexity science, however, we struggle cognitively to 
naturalise its application.”
With regard to the four regimes of the scientific way of warfare described in the theory 
section of this article (Bousquet 2008), the data suggest that none should be disregarded. 
Although, it can be claimed that we are in an era of chaoplexic, networked warfare, with 
growing systemic risks and interdependencies, the mechanistic, the thermodynamic, and 
the cybernetic forms of warfare still prevail. Complexity does not imply the absolute 
replacement of any previous paradigm, but the holistic understanding of many inter-
twined phenomena. This goes along with the notion of different schools of complexity 
thinking itself (see e.g., Richardson et al. 2000, Thomas 2019). The harder, mathematical, 
and computational techniques of analyzing the security environment and the softer, 
metaphorical approaches of understanding complexity are best used in combination, 
both in research and in practice (see also Zweibelson 2016b).
This study narrows the research gap on how members of the military in general perceive 
complexity as a scientific concept. Doing so involved clarifying the connection between the 
theory of complexity and the practice of acting in a complex security environment. By 
analyzing the views of Finnish military officers, we have showed that the complex-systems 
paradigm is not alien to the military. In reality, many existing operating models – such as 
mission command and whole-of-government approaches – are very similar in terms of the 
kind of activity often expected in a complex operating environment.
The data indicate that future research on complexity, in the context of the security 
environment, could beneficially focus more closely on examining the different whole-of- 
government approaches. The positive views expressed by the military officers in this 
article on the Finnish Comprehensive Security model require further detailed empirical 
research before it would be feasible to draw any stronger conclusions on the applicability 
of the model to a complex operating environment. It could also be worthwhile, in the 
spirit of the Comprehensive Security approach, to look at how complexity is perceived 
among other security authorities, such as the fire and rescue services and the police.
Notes
1. Other public authorities working in the domains of safety and security can also attend 
courses.
2. Idea/statement: The current security environment is complex. n = 61. Frequency distribu-
tions: strongly agree 59%, partially agree 33%, neutral 3 %, partially disagree 5 %.
3. Idea/statement: Complexity just seems to increase in the international and national security 
environments with increased data and information, and accelerated data transfer. The same 
complexity has always prevailed. Complexity is subjectively experienced, relative, and non- 
measurable. n = 38. Frequency distributions: strongly agree 47%, partially agree 32%, neutral 
3 %, partially disagree 18%.
4. Idea/statement: High-speed communication and social media have increased complexity in 
the security environment. Social media is or can be a fierce catalyst. High-speed communica-
tion also enables the intentional shaping of the global security environment. n = 42. Frequency 
distributions: strongly agree 67%, partially agree 24%, partially disagree 7%, strongly 
disagree 2 %.
5. Idea/statement: Digital data transfer has increased the complexity of the global security 
environment, as real-time action, the amount of information, a lack of delay, and actors 
and variables increase the challenges of decision making. Further explanations: difficulty in 
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analysis, flood of information, and human data processing capability. n = 37. Frequency 
distributions: strongly agree 54%, partially agree 30%, neutral 3 %, partially disagree 8 %, 
strongly disagree 5 %.
6. Idea/statement: Finland is no longer a land of milk and honey. Many global threats or their 
repercussions also affect Finland’s security environment. n = 45. Frequency distributions: 
strongly agree 64%, partially agree 24%, partially disagree 11%.
7. Idea/statement. The Finnish security environment is no longer distinguishable from the global 
security environment, but the same threats and challenges apply to all. n = 59. Frequency 
distributions: strongly agree 14%, partially agree 27%, partially disagree 59%.
8. Idea/statement: Finland’s security environment is the same as the global security environ-
ment – the scale is only smaller. n = 60. Frequency distributions: strongly agree 8 %, partially 
agree 28%, partially disagree 42%, strongly disagree 22%.
9. Idea/statement: Diversification of threats has increased disruptions in the global security 
environment. n = 52. Frequency distributions: strongly agree 17%, partially agree 40%, 
neutral 10%, partially disagree 27%, strongly disagree 4%, do not know 2%.
10. Idea/statement: We often step into a so-called complexity trap, that is, we make the problems 
we face seem more complex than they are. n = 58. Frequency distributions: strongly agree 
28%, partially agree 40%, neutral 7%, partially disagree 24%.
11. Idea/statement: Only complex solutions can solve the problems of a complex operating 
environment. n = 59. Frequency distributions: strongly agree 3%, partially agree 8%, partially 
disagree 42%, strongly disagree 46%.
12. Idea/statement: The concepts of complexity help to increase understanding of the security 
environment. n = 55. Frequency distributions: strongly agree 42%, partially agree 29%, 
neutral 7%, partially disagree 22%.
13. Idea/statement: Finland’s foreign, security and defense policies are correct in Finland’s com-
plex security environment. n = 57. Frequency distributions: strongly agree 5 %, partially 
agree 37%, neutral 7%, partially disagree 39%, strongly disagree 7%, do not know 5 %.
14. Idea/statement: Finland’s security policy aims to respond to a complex security environment 
by maintaining alternatives (maintaining adaptive space). n = 45. Frequency distributions: 
partially agree 71%, neutral 16%, partially disagree 13%.
15. Idea/statement: Instead of security and defense policy reports, ONLY a comprehensive security 
report should be produced. n = 41. Frequency distributions: strongly agree 10%, partially 
agree 17%, neutral 7%, partially disagree 12%, strongly disagree 54%.
16. Idea/statement: The Finnish concept for comprehensive security is Finland’s attempt to meet 
the challenges of the complex security environment. n = 48. Frequency distributions: strongly 
agree 48%, partially agree 42%, neutral 4%, partially disagree 4%, strongly disagree 2%.
17. Idea/statement: Cooperation between public authorities will increase the resilience of society 
and its ability to respond to a complex operating environment. n = 46. Frequency distribu-
tions: strongly agree 65%, partially agree 35%.
18. Idea/statement: The comprehensive security model must be adaptive to respond to the 
complexity of the security environment. n = 60. Frequency distributions: strongly agree 
93%, partially agree 3%, neutral 2%, partially disagree 2%.
19. Idea/statement: The Finnish concept for comprehensive security is adaptive, i.e. adaptable to 
the challenges of a complex operating environment. n = 50. Frequency distributions: strongly 
agree 16%, partially agree 62%, neutral 8%, partially disagree 14%.
20. Idea/statement: Strengthening resilience by committing each citizen to the tasks of compre-
hensive security is a way to respond to a more complex modern world. n = 42. Frequency 
distributions: strongly agree 19%, partially agree 40%, neutral 5 %, partially disagree 29%, 
strongly disagree 7%.
21. Idea/statement: Complexity should be taken into account in national preparedness through 
education, upbringing, and information sharing. These important steps will increase citizens’ 
awareness, broaden the circle of people in the information community, and strengthen media 
literacy. n = 39. Frequency distributions: strongly agree 33%, partially agree 28%, neutral 
15%, partially disagree 23%.
18 H. RAISIO ET AL.
22. Idea/statement: More transparent communication on the security situation improves society’s 
ability to understand the complex security policy environment. n = 43. Frequency distribu-
tions: strongly agree 21%, partially agree 63%, neutral 7%, partially disagree 9%.
23. Idea/statement: Bureaucratic and hierarchical command structures make it difficult to adapt 
in a complex operating environment. n = 59. Frequency distributions: strongly agree 39%, 
partially agree 36%, neutral 8%, partially disagree 15%, strongly disagree 2%.
24. Idea/statement: Complexity should be taken into account in the implementation of compre-
hensive security by delegating power to authorities at the lower levels of hierarchy, increasing 
the freedom of action of executive authorities and establishing a cooperative relationship at 
ever lower levels of authority. n = 46. Frequency distributions: strongly agree 50%, partially 
agree 35%, neutral 11%, partially disagree 2%, do not know 2%.
25. Idea/statement: Decision-making power should be moved as low down the hierarchy as 
possible, especially in government, to ensure that the response is timely in a complex operating 
environment. Provided that everyone acts according to mission command to achieve 
a common objective (comprehensive security). Justification: Currently, for example, decision- 
making, preparedness management and responsibility is distributed to many upper levels, 
cyber as a model example. n = 44. Frequency distributions: strongly agree 32%, partially 
agree 39%, neutral 9%, partially disagree 20%.
26. Idea/statement: A mission command is a way to handle complexity. n = 47. Frequency 
distributions: strongly agree 36%, partially agree 45%, neutral 4%, partially disagree 13%, 
strongly disagree 2%.
27. Idea/statement: National resources may not be adequate to respond to the complexity. n = 48. 
Frequency distributions: strongly agree 10%, partially agree 38%, partially disagree 38%, 
strongly disagree 15%.
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